Intrusion detection using machine learning by Οικονόμου, Χρυσούλα Α.
  
 
ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΙΑΣ 
ΤΜΗΜΑ ΗΛΕΚΤΡΟΛΟΓΩΝ ΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΩΝ 
ΥΠΟΛΟΓΙΣΤΩΝ 
 
 
 
 
“Ανίχνευση Επιθέσεων με τη χρήση Μηχανικής Μάθησης” 
“Intrusion Detection Using Machine Learning” 
Διπλωματική Εργασία 
 
 
Οικονόμου Χρυσούλα 
 
Επιβλέποντες Καθηγητές: Αντωνόπουλος Χρήστος, Λάλης Σπύρος 
 
Βόλος, 10 Οκτωβρίου 2018 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Ευχαριστίες 
 
 
Με την ολοκλήρωση της Διπλωματικής Εργασίας μου θα ήθελα πρωτίστως να 
ευχαριστήσω τον επιβλέποντα καθηγητή μου κύριο Αντωνόπουλο Χρήστο, για την 
εξαιρετική συνεργασία και την ουσιαστική καθοδήγηση που μου προσέφερε κατά τη 
διάρκεια της εκπόνησης. Η άμεση ανταπόκρισή του, όποτε χρειάστηκα βοήθεια, ήταν 
καταλυτική στην ομαλή ολοκλήρωση της εργασίας. 
 
Επιπλέον, οφείλω ένα μεγάλο ευχαριστώ στην οικογένειά μου και κυρίως στη μητέρα 
μου. Η στήριξη τους, συναισθηματική και υλική, ήταν κομβική, όχι μόνο κατά την 
περάτωση της εργασίας αλλά και στη συνολικότερη πορεία μου ως σήμερα. 
 
Ακόμη θα ήθελα να ευχαριστήσω τη Μαρίνα, το Γιώργο, το Γιώργο, την Έλενα και 
όλους τους φίλους μου, που ήταν διπλά μου σε αυτό το επταετές ταξίδι . Τέλος, θα ήθελα 
να ευχαριστήσω το Θεόφιλο για την υπομονή του,  και τη στήριξη που μου παρέχει  όλο 
αυτόν τον καιρό. 
 
Χωρίς όλους αυτούς του ανθρώπους, όλα θα ήταν πολύ πιο δύσκολα και σίγουρα όχι 
τόσο όμορφα. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Περίληψη 
 
Η συνεχής αύξηση των έξυπνων συσκευών, όπως επίσης και η ψηφιοποίηση εταιριών και 
δημόσιων υπηρεσιών, οδήγησε σε μία αξιοσημείωτη αύξηση της κίνησης στο Διαδίκτυο. 
Επιπλέον, οι τεχνολογίες του  Διαδικτύου των Πραγμάτων (Internet of Things), επέφερε 
τη δημιουργία πολυάριθμων δικτύων υπολογιστών, που κατακλύζονται –πολύ συχνά-  
από ευαίσθητες πληροφορίες. Όλα τα παραπάνω δημιούργησαν την επιτακτική ανάγκη 
για δυνατούς μηχανισμούς ασφάλειας, με στόχο την προστασία των προσωπικών 
δεδομένων που κυκλοφορούν στο διαδίκτυο, καθημερινά 
 
Τα Συστήματα Ανίχνευσης Εισβολών έχουν σημαντικό ρόλο στη διαδικασία 
διασφάλισης ενός δικτύου υπολογιστών. Χρησιμοποιήσαμε μια τεχνική μηχανικής 
εκμάθησης, συγκεκριμένα, Τεχνητά Νευρωνικά Δίκτυα που εκπαιδεύονται με τεχνικές 
Βαθιάς Εκμάθησης, για να δημιουργήσουμε ένα Σύστημα Ανίχνευσης Εισβολών που 
τροφοδοτείται και ελέγχεται από με τις AWID βάσεις δεδομένων του Πανεπιστημίου 
Αιγαίου. Δοκιμάσαμε Δυαδικούς και Πολυταξικούς Ταξινομητές και χρησιμοποιήσαμε 
δύο διαφορετικά σετ τροφοδοσία. Η ταξινόμηση αφορούσε σε Μεθόδους Εκτέλεσης 
επιθέσεων. Συγκεκριμένα, τις Flooding, Impersonation and Injection. 
 
Η βασική συνεισφορά αυτής της εργασίας, είναι πως δεν υπάρχουν δημοσιευμένα άλλα 
εγχειρήματα αξιολόγησης Δυαδικών Ταξινομητών που χρησιμοποιούν τη Βαθιά 
Εκμάθηση. Έτσι, μπορεί να αποτελέσει το εναρκτήριο σημείο για περαιτέρω βελτιώσεις. 
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Abstract 
 
The constant increase of smart devices, as well as the digitalization of both enterprises 
and social services led to a notable growth of traffic over Internet. Moreover, Internet of 
Things Technologies induced the creation of numerous computer networks that are 
flooded with –very commonly- sensitive information. All the above induce the need of 
building strong security systems, in order to protect the personal information which are 
communicated through Internet every day. 
 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) play a major role in the procedure of keeping a 
computer network secure. Thus, they are widely used as defending mechanisms. We used 
a machine learning technique, especially Deep Learning Artificial Neural Networks, to 
create an IDS that is trained and tested with the AWID datasets. We experimented with 
both Multi-Class and Binary Classifiers and tried different Input Sets. The classification 
concerned Attack Execution Methods, namely Flooding, Impersonation and Injection. 
 
The main contribution of this dissertation is that there are no other published projects 
using Binary Classifiers that are trained with Deep Learning Methods. Thus, this can be 
the starting point for further improvements. 
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1. Introduction 
During the past decade the use of computers and smart devices has increased 
significantly and this upturn does not seem to stop in the next years. According to Cisco 
Visual Networking Index(“Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic 
Forecast Update”,2016) “The total number of smartphones (including phablets) will be 
over 50 percent of global devices and connections by 2021”, as well as “Smartphones 
will surpass four-fifths of mobile data traffic (86 percent) by 2021.” More devices 
connected to the internet means more personal data exposed. This increase is not applied 
just in terms of private using.  In most developed countries, there is an ongoing effort of 
digitalizing social services such as healthcare and tax services. As far as industries are 
concerned, it is worth mentioning that new technologies, such as Big Data and Cloud 
Computing, are widely embraced. As a result, the need of securing all these data and 
transactions, that are digitally recreated, is getting an issue of great importance.  
 
It is also notable, that another technology advance which has brought up a lot of security 
challenges, because of its rapid development, is the Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT 
gives people the opportunity to create a network of physical devices, in order to remotely 
control them. These devices include simple home appliances, as well as medical devices 
and factories heavy equipment. Thus, intrusions in such networks may have dangerous 
costs. 
 
In order to protect networks and information systems, the first step that should be made is 
to be able to recognize an attempt of intrusion. By doing so, the intrusion can be stopped 
and the defender can create a stronger and more sophisticated shield against the attack. 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) aim to secure networks from attacks, in order to 
preserve the confidentiality, integrity and availability (also known as CIA triad) of 
information. On the other hand, attackers try to take advantage of a system security 
vulnerabilities in order to gain root access as to control them, retrieve data or damage 
them.  
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This dissertation introduces an IDS that uses machine learning and specifically neural 
network, and uses the AWID dataset for training and testing purposes. We created two 
Artificial Neural Networks that have different architectures. The first one is a multi-class 
classifier, while the second one consists of stacked binary ones. Furthermore, we 
experimented with two different sets of attributes as input.  We compare the results, 
based on handful of aspects, as the number of false alarms or the accuracy rates. 
 
Even though there have been several experiments including neural networks and the 
AWID dataset, this is the first attempt to test this dataset on a binary Artificial Neural 
Network. All previous projects (described in Section 2) had multi-class classification 
models and experimented with different training algorithms.  
 
The rest of the manuscript is organized as follows: Section 2 concerns the Related Work 
while Section 3 includes Background information. Our implementation is described in 
detail in Section 4. Finally Section 5 includes the Conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
2 Related Work 
 
Kolias et al. introduced the AWID dataset in 2016. This dataset consists of labeled WiFi 
packets, which are classified according to their attack type, or if they are harmful, they 
are just labeled as normal. Along with dataset, they presented the implementation of a 
variety of machine learning techniques, including artificial neural networks.  However, 
the accuracy scores were quickly surpassed by the work of Thanthridge et al.(2016) , 
Aminanto et al.(2017,2018) and Usha and Kavitha(2016). 
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Thanthrige et al.(2016) published a paper, showing the importance of feature reduction 
and its impact on the detection accuracy and the classification speed of an IDS. In order 
to prove this, they also used multiple machine learning techniques. They used the AWID 
public datasets to train and test the IDSs created.  Aminanto et al. (2017) tried to improve 
the Impersonation attack detection rate -compared to the results of Kolias et al. (2016). 
They used artificial neural networks to reduce the features and they experimented using 
the Stacked Auto Encoder learner. They manage to achieve a significant improvement to 
the rates. 
 
This year, Aminato et al.(2018)  managed to achieve the best performance in published 
literature(Aminanto et al., 2018). They did so, by using a weight-based feature selection 
method with a light machine-learning classifier.  
 
Usha and Kavitha(2016) used a Support Vector Machine and the AWID dataset. This led 
to a better trade-off between detection accuracy and learning time, and at the same time a 
reduced false positives and computation complexity. Of course, they reduced the features 
used as input.  
 
Thing (2017) proposed a deep learning approach for intrusion detection using the AWID 
datasets. They experimented the utilization of different activation functions in two 
different artificial neural networks, which included two and three hidden layers, 
respectively. Their 4-class classifiers achieved a 98.6688% overall accuracy. 
 
The key difference, between these project and ours, is that we compare a multiclass 
classifier to a binary one, while the others compare different training algorithms. 
 
4 
 
3 Background 
3.1 Intrusion Detection Systems 
Intrusion Detection Systems are devices or software that track abnormal behavior and 
policy violations. The first IDS was introduced by Dorothy E. Denning in 1986. IDSs 
have a lot in common with firewalls as they both try to defend a network. However, 
firewall functionality differs from IDS, as the former prevent attackers from intruding the 
network. In contrast, IDSs identify potentially malicious activity and raise an alarm. 
Systems that detect such activities and, in addition, take some corresponding action are 
referred to as Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS). Another major difference between 
these defending mechanisms is the fact that firewalls are exclusively network protecting 
mechanisms, while IDS can also be used to monitor malicious behaviour inside a system. 
 
In terms of system positioning IDS can be classified into two categories. The first one is 
the Network IDS (NIDS). As the name itself implies, NIDS are monitoring network 
traffic and aim to detect external attacks. The most notable advantage of NIDS is that 
they can defend all the devices connected to the network, and it does not require 
replication. The second category is the Host based IDS (HIDS). HIDS are located within 
a system, and besides network traffic, they also monitor the systems files and processes, 
in order to detect if there is any change in the critical ones. Because of this, HIDS have 
much more information to form the signature of a normal behavior which makes them 
more reliable. 
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Figure 3.1: Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (Retrieved from: “HIDS (Host-Based 
Intrusion Detection System) - Bauman National Library”, n.d. )       
  
L.P Dias et al.(2017) categorize IDSs based in the detection method used in Misuse or 
Signature Detection and in Anomaly Detection systems. The first type of IDS needs some 
predefined attack patterns in order to be able to recognize them. Every other kind of 
behavior is considered normal. Keeping in mind that attacks are constantly evolving and 
new types of attacks are made, in order to stay protected, the list of the predefined 
patterns should be very commonly updated. Of course, there is always the possibility that 
the update may come after the attack, but the danger can be regulated by increasing the 
update frequency. On the contrary, Anomaly Detection Systems functionality is 
characterized by the just reversed logic. As a consequence, the predefined patterns 
concern the normal behavior. Any different set of characteristics, is flagged as malicious 
behavior. It can be easily seen that this type of systems can be “overprotective”, since the 
networks traffic is not static and its features can widely vary (Sommer et al, 2010) even 
when there is no threatening behavior. 
 
When it comes to IDS evaluation, a very common indicator of a well-developed one, is 
the amount of the true/false positives and true/false negatives. True positives refer to the 
packets, correctly classified as harmful, while true negatives are the packets that are 
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correctly classified as benevolent.   False positives are the alarms that are signed by an 
IDS when there was not an actual malicious behavior. False positives are increased in 
Anomaly Detection Systems, due to the vast network diversity. False negatives refer to 
packets or generally activities that are considered harmless, while they shouldn’t be. It is 
clear that, false negatives are far more harmful for a system, but what should also be 
mentioned is that false positives require a significant amount of analyzing time which 
finally leads to a benign activity. 
  
3.2 Artificial Neural Networks 
In 1959 Arthur Samuel introduced the term Machine Learning. According to Samuel 
Machine Learning is the process that makes computers able to “learn”, in a very similar 
way that a human would, if given the same data. Machine Learning implies that 
computers are not pre-programmed to handle new data. It is the training session that leads 
the computer to make decisions, through statistics and pattern recognition. Machine 
Learning is a part of the greater field of Artificial Intelligence. There are a handful of 
approaches to apply Machine Learning. This paper studies Artificial Neural Networks 
learning algorithm. 
 
Artificial Neural Networks are computing systems inspired by the human brain 
functionality. They try to mimic the process followed by neurons inside the brain. Just 
like the physical ones, artificial neurons that are “connected” to each other can 
communicate in order to process signals and finally classify them. 
 
Considering the main architecture of ANNs, it can be organized in three basic parts. The 
first one the Input Layer. As the name implies, it is the part of the ANN that receives 
signals or patterns, in order to redirect them to the following layers. The second part is 
the Hidden or Intermediate layers. They are the layers that perform the most 
computational processes, as they are the ones responsible to combine the input data and 
then create patterns, in order to generalize the results. Unlike the other two categories, 
hidden layers can be multiple, according to the combination of computational complexity 
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and desired accuracy.  The last part of the ANN architecture, is the Output layer which 
forms the final classification of the data, based in the previous layer computations. 
 
Figure 3.2: Feedforward ANN Architecture (Retrieved from: Dawson et al, 2000) 
  
All layers consist of neurons. Neurons are responsible for forwarding –or not- the signals 
inside the layers and among them. To do so, multiple functions are used, also known as 
Activation Functions. The most commonly used, beginning from the simplest one, are the 
Step, the Linear, the Sigmoid, the Tanh and the Relu functions. There is no need to use 
the same activation function in all hidden layers. Just like the number of hidden layers 
and the number of neurons, the choice between these functions is up to developer’s 
judgement.  
 
 
 Figure 3.3: Different types of Activation Function (Retrieved from: Malhotra, 2018 
) 
ANNs can be also classified in 3 categories based on the way neurons are organized. The 
first one is the Single-Layer Feedforward Architecture. It includes only the input and the 
output layer, so it is the least complex of the rest. The second is the Multiple-Layer 
Feedforward Architecture. Unlike the previous one, this architecture includes all three 
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basic layers. In addition, most of the times the number of layers exceeds 3. Namely, there 
are more than one hidden layers. Last but not least, is the Recurrent Architecture It is the 
most interesting and at the same time most complex architecture of all, as it uses its 
output as input for the subsequent computations.  
 
Figure 3.4: ANN basic architectures (Retrieved from: Da, S. I. et al., 2017) 
 
As Haykin(1999) notes, ANNs can perform tasks like pattern matching very skillfully, as 
a result of their capability of reorganizing their structure correspondingly. Furthermore, 
ANNs can learn and model relationships that linear programs are incapable of doing so. 
Another notable advantage of ANN is that they can generalize. After the first phase of the 
training, they can come up with relations between the data that were not obvious initially. 
What really makes ANNs useful, is their ability of learning and especially self-learning. 
Learning can be interpreted making a system able to correctly correspond to a new input 
or task after having been trained. Although, ANNs require a notable amount of 
computing resources because their architecture differs from the architecture of 
microprocessors (Shah et al. ,2012). Moreover, in order to develop an efficient ANN, it is 
of great importance to “feed” it with a large training set that also results in a considerable 
resource usage. 
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3.3 Feature Selection  
 
The input layer of a ANN receives the key attributes of each data index, which are used 
to categorize the data. Most of the times, datasets include multiple attributes per index 
which are not always useful (not for all classifications). This is due to the fact that 
datasets are not exclusively created for single purposes. The same dataset can be used to 
make classifications according to different parameters. Namely, what might be useful for 
one classification problem, may be completely irrelevant for another.  
 
The correct choice of features used as input is very important, as two problems, with high 
impact on the results, may occur. If the features are misselected, in terms that more 
parameters than actually needed are used, then the model is driven to “overfitting “(Aalst 
et al., 2008). In other words, the patterns generated are too close to the training set and as 
a result, the generalization required to classify new data is very difficult. On the other 
hand, having fewer features, than the features necessary to identify the pattern, as input 
leads to “underfitting”. Underfitting refers to the incapability of a model to generate a 
pattern that corresponds correctly to the input due to the lack of important characteristics 
of the training set.  Both overfitted and underfitted models fail on new datasets, while -
quite obviously- overfitted ones have a very good performance on training sets. 
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Figure 3.5: Relation between model used and errors (Retrieved from: Giovinazzo, 2017) 
 
Figure 3.6: Relation between model and data (Retrieved from: “Model Fit: Underfitting 
vs Overfitting- Amazon Machine Learning”, n.d.) 
 
All these, sum up to the fact that in order to develop an efficient ANN, one should take 
under consideration the need to pick certain index attributes, in other words, feature 
selection. Feature selection is a key step of creating a ANN. The impact of ignoring it is 
serious as it has a great reflection in accuracy rates. Overfeeding the network with excess 
information, makes the classification very difficult, as the common characteristics 
between the categories are only a small percentage of the total.  
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3.4 Datasets 
As previously mentioned, a key part of developing an efficient ANN, is the training 
phase. Not only is it mandatory, but it also greatly determines the quality of the results. 
The dataset used during this process should be carefully chosen. According to the 
purpose of the ANN function one should take into consideration a variety of 
characteristics to evaluate. To start with, the size of the dataset plays a major role. It is 
clear that, if the input has a lot of entries, then it would be easier for the ANN to identify 
more accurate patterns and thus, be more efficient. However, a large dataset means a lot 
of computational processes, when at the same time it does not guarantee high accuracy 
rates. What should also be considered is the quality of the data. In other words, the data 
given as input should contribute to form the greatest picture. Each entry of the data 
consists of some attributes, also known as features. In fact these are the real input. It can 
be easily understood, that a dataset with a lot of missing attributes information, would 
lead to a low accuracy output. On the other hand, having a very large number of attributes 
is also ineffective. The generalization of the results would be almost impossible if the 
characteristics, that were to be examined, were excessive. Lastly, the most crucial matter, 
concerning the quality of the dataset, is the how updated the data is. There is absolutely 
no point in training a system with obsolete data. In conclusion, choosing the suitable data 
is as important as correctly developing the neural network. 
 
In case of datasets needed in training Intrusion Detection Systems, the same aspects 
should be taken into account. However, there is another challenge that people in this 
domain face. There are a very few public datasets that can be used in the training phase. 
The most known public datasets are the DARPA/Lincoln Labs packet traces 1998 and 
1999(“Datasets | MIT Lincoln Laboratory”, n.d.)  and the  KDD Cup 1999 Data(“KDD 
Cup 1999 Data”, 1999). It is more than obvious that a 20-year-old set is outdated. 
According to Moore’s Law the number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit doubles 
about every two years. This also reflects on processor performance. Attackers take 
advantage of their system properties in order to orchestrate more advanced attacks. This 
means faster or more sophisticated attacks.  Keeping this in mind, it is clear that with the 
systems constantly advancing, it is quite probable that the number and severity of attacks 
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will increase. In order to intrude systems, attackers follow current technology and try to 
adapt to it. Thus, a dataset that old may not represent contemporary attacks.  As Sommer 
et al.(2010) suggests, besides being outdated, these datasets have been over-studied and 
no interest is raised in recreating a NIDS responding to these attacks. The real question is 
why there are not a more datasets available. First of all, storing millions of packets raises 
privacy issues. It is not plausible to ensure that none of the millions of packets contains 
sensitive information. As a result, very frequently there are no legal permissions to do so. 
This leads to the effort of simulating network traffic, to create a dataset. The fact that 
Internet is not easily simulated as S. Floyd states, makes the creation even more difficult.  
 
3.4.1 The AWID Dataset 
The public dataset (Kolias et al., 2016), consists of two subsets, a large and a smaller one. 
Both subsets are divided in two parts the training and the evaluating one. What needs to 
noticed is that the test set is not derived from the training one. Thus the reliability of the 
results is not compromised. The datasets have 2 versions. In the first (ATK), data is 
classified into 16 categories in accordance with the kind of attack performed. The second 
one (CLS), has 4 categories according to the methodology of execution. Each entry in the 
dataset has 155 attributes, with the last one being the class label. In case of a missing 
value, the corresponding attribute is represented with a “?”. 
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Table 3.1: Class distribution-Full set (Retrieved from: Kollias et al, 2014) 
 
Table 3.2: Class distribution-Reduced set (Retrieved from: Kollias et al, 2014) 
 
3.4.1.1 Methodology of Attack Execution 
The paper focuses on the AWID-CLS sets, namely the classification that is made 
according to the methodology that is used during an attack. There are four categories that 
the packets are sorted into; Flooding, Impersonation, Injection and Normal. 
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● Flooding 
Flooding is a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. DoS Attacks are orchestrated in order to 
bring a network or a server down. (“Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks", 2013). 
To accomplish this, the network is “flooded” with connection requests and eventually 
becomes incapable to respond to any of them, even the not malevolent ones.  When the 
number of requests excess the capacity of the memory buffer, the system can no longer 
establish new connections. Whether the attacker use one or more computers and internet 
connections to flood the network, the attack is characterized as DoS or DdoS (Distributed 
Denial of Service). DDoS attacks, as shown Figure 3.7, exist for a long time and they are 
getting more potent through the years. 
Figure 3.7: DDoS Attacks Over Time (Jeftovic, 2018) 
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Flooding attacks are multilayer ones (Regan et. al, 2017). They can be applied in layers 
other than the network. To be more specific, one can achieve Flooding attack in the 
Physical Layer through signal jamming. In the Data Link layer, the attacker “floods” the 
ARP tables, of the target network, with false MAC addresses resulting in the denial of 
access to channels for new nodes. The fourth and fifth layers, id est Transport and 
Application layers, Flooding attacks occur via SYN Flooding and certain malevolent 
programs.   
 
● Injection 
As the name itself implies, Injection attack refers to the process of “injecting” malicious 
code into a program. So as to achieve this, attackers provide the program with a 
malicious input. Then, the interpreter is misled to compile that input as a part of the 
genuine code. Eventually the attackers manage to change the normal execution flow in 
their interest without proper authorization. This kind of attacks have various impacts of 
scaled severeness. There can be a loss of data or a data theft, and if the attack is more 
sophisticated and a declaration of root privileges is achieved, there can even be a full 
system compromise. 
 
The Open Web Application Security Project (“OWASP Top Ten 2017 Project - 
OWASP”, n.d.) lists Injection attacks as the number one application security risk. The 
reason behind this, besides the already noted impacts, is that apart from being very 
dangerous for the victim system, Injections attacks can easily spread widely.  Injection 
attacks, such as SQL Injection (SQLi) and Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS), which also are the 
most common ones, are a very typical example of this characteristic when talking about 
legacy applications. 
 
What is also alarming about Injection attacks is that the vulnerabilities allowing an 
attacker to inject malicious code, are very commonly present in websites. In 2010 
WhiteHat Security released a report (“WhiteHat Security 9th Website Security Statistics 
Report”, 2010) presenting the percentage of the likelihood of a website having a 
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vulnerability by class. As it can be seen in Figure 3.8, Cross-Site scripting is the top in all 
types of scripting technologies. 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Top Ten Classes of Attack (Retrieved from: “WhiteHat Security 9th Website 
Security Statistics Report”,2010 ) 
 
● Impersonation 
The basic idea behind Impersonation Attacks is masquerading into a trusted -for the 
victim system- source. To achieve this the attacker uses a trusted node identity, such as 
Medium Access Control (MAC) address and/or Internet Protocol (IP) address. Even 
though there exist some security techniques such as Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), 
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), and 802.11i (WPA2), attackers are not yet prevented 
from stealing such credentials. This happens due to the fact that encryption concerns only 
the data frames. Management and Control frames are vulnerable to spoofing (Lakshmi et 
al., 2014). Impersonation can occur in different forms, especially device cloning, address 
spoofing, unauthorized access, rogue access points and replay (Barbeau et al, 2006). 
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Device Cloning refers to mimicking a device by altering the attacker’s device to have 
H/W addresses of a trusted device. When the duration of this imitation is one frame, then 
another form of Impersonation happens; (MAC) address spoofing.  The above techniques 
are key steps to deauthentication and disassociation attacks. Impersonation is very useful 
for gaining unauthorized access. The attacker may use the pre-referred techniques to 
obtain privileges and be able to access data or alter the network. Another form of 
Impersonation is the Rogue Access Point. In this case, there is an attacker station which 
is programmed to have the specifications of a trusted access point. Hence, many clients 
that are connected to the second one, at first, disconnect from the legitimate station and 
then they are connected to the attacker. Last but not least, Replay attacks concern the 
replay protection. Replay protection is made to guarantee that the packets received are 
not duplicates and that they are freshly generated. 
 
Impersonation attacks are often orchestrated by bots. Attacker bots try to imitate human 
visitors so as to skip security barriers. Below are some graphs from the annual Imperva 
Incapsula Bot Traffic Report, now in its fifth year which is an ongoing statistical study of 
the bot traffic landscape. As is can be seen in Figures 3.9 and 3.10 bots visiting websites 
outnumber human visitors. This, in combination with the fact that “bad” bots are 
overwhelmingly impersonators, which can be observed in Figure 3.10 chart makes this 
kind of attack very important. 
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Figure 3.9: Traffic Breakdown (Retrieved from: Zeifman, 2017) 
 
Figure 3.10: Impersonator bot and bad bot traffic trends (Retrieved from: Zeifman, 2017) 
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4. Implementation 
  
Our goal is to create an Artificial Neural Network that serves as an Intrusion Detection 
System. During the process of optimizing the accuracy and the efficiency of it, we 
experimented with several ANN architectures and tried different structures concerning 
the total organization of the model. We suggest a deep learning approach with two or 
more hidden layers. The dataset that Kolias et al.(2016) provided, allowed us to build a 
supervised ANN because all the indexes were labeled.  We chose the sets that classified 
the packets according to the methodology of the attack execution, especially the reduced 
ones (AWID-CLS-R-Tst, AWID-CLS-R-Trn). This chapter discusses the different 
approaches used and how the results are sensitive to the value of a number of parameters.  
 
4.1 Keras and Tensorflow 
To start with, we used Keras to build our ANN model. Keras(“Keras | TensorFlow” ,n.d.) 
is a high-level neural networks API, written in Python and capable of running on top of 
Tensorflow, CNTK(Seide et al., 2016) or Theano (Ketkar,2017). It was developed with a 
focus on enabling fast experimentation. It supports both convolutional networks and 
recurrent networks, as well as combinations of the two. Moreover, Keras models can run 
seamlessly on Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) and Central Processing Unit (CPU) 
(Keras | TensorFlow).  
 
To perform the complex numerical computations required for the building of the ANN 
we used Tensorflow. TensorFlow(“TensorFlow”, n.d.). is an open source software library 
for high performance numerical computation. A very useful tool, in the process of 
creating the models was SciPy(“Scientific Computing Tools for Python — SciPy.org”, 
n.d.).  SciPy (pronounced “Sigh Pie”) is a Python-based ecosystem of open-source 
software for mathematics, science, and engineering. In particular, we used NumPy and 
Matplotlib from  the core packages. Matplotlib is a Python 2D plotting library which 
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produces publication quality figures (Hunter, 2007). NumPy is the fundamental package 
for scientific computing with Python. 
 
 
4.2 Result Metrics 
In order to evaluate the models, we will introduce 3 new metrics. The first one is the 
Recall or True Positive Rate (TPR): 
 
       𝑇𝑃𝑅 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
 
Recall represents the percentage of correctly classified instances. 
 
The second metric that we will use is the Miss Rate or False Negative Rate (FNR):  
   𝐹𝑁𝑅 =
𝐹𝑁
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
 
 
Miss ia the rate of malicious packets that were incorrectly classifies as harmless.   
 
The last one is the False Alarm or False Positive Rate (FPR): 
   𝐹𝑃𝑅 =
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑁
 
False alarm happens when a normal packet is considered malicious and thus the ids 
alarms the system, needlessly. 
 
Where TP stands for True Positives, TN for True Negatives, FP for false Positives and 
FN for False Negatives.     
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4.3 Artificial Neural Network Models 
The key difference between the two approaches used, is the number of the classes of the 
output. The first was one Multi-Class Classifier and the second was a hierarchy of four 
binary ANNs.  In the following paragraphs we will describe the structure and 
functionality of both models in detail. 
4.3.1 Multi-Class Classifier 
The Multi-Class Classifier consists of 4 layers, the input layer, two hidden layers and the 
output layer. The main idea was simple; for starters, the ANN is trained with the labeled 
data of the AWID-CLS-R-Trn set and then we use the AWID-CLS-R-Tst set to make 
predictions. 
 
The first parameter that required careful consideration was the input dimension. Each 
index in the dataset has 155 attributes.  As already mentioned in the Section 3.3, using 
such a large number of features as input, makes the ANN incapable of creating efficient 
recognition patterns. Therefore, it was necessary to narrow down the input.  Kolias et 
al.(2016) also note the importance of the feature reduction in their paper. More 
specifically they mention that “only 20 attributes are immediately related to the attacks 
contained in the training set”, and they provide  a table containing these attributes (Table 
4.1).    
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Table 4.1: Input set as suggested by Kolias et al. (Retrieved from: Kollias et al., 2016) 
 
Following the guidelines given in the paper we created an ANN that has 20 attributes as 
input, followed by two hidden layers with 16 and 10 neurons respectively, and lastly an 
output of 4 classes. The classes of the output, as described previously are Flooding, 
Injection, Impersonation and Normal. In order to decide the architecture of the ANN we 
used, we experimented with different numbers of layers and neurons. The common place 
between all the different models we created, was a descending number of neurons as the 
number of the hidden layer increased. The main idea, was to gradually form sets that 
have more things in common, and so, each packet can be part of larger groups to finally 
meet the requirements for the class it belongs to. Beginning from 20 neurons, which was 
the input layer, we end up with 4 neurons representing every output class. The activation 
function used in hidden layers is the RELU function. Since our model is deep learning 
one, it would be better to use n activation function which is not computationally 
expensive. The RELU function involves simpler mathematical operations and as a result 
is less expensive in comparison with tanh and sigmoid. In the output layer we used the 
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SOFTMAX activation function. SOFTMAX gives the opportunity to use the output 
values as predicted probabilities, because they are in the range of 0 and 1. 
 
Another problem that we had to solve, is that the dataset contains mixed types of data. 
Beyond integers and floats, there are also hexadecimal numbers and strings. Moreover in 
case of a missing value the field is filled with a “?”. We cannot process data of many 
types in neural networks. To overcome this, we encoded the input to integers using the 
LabelEncoder class by Scikit-learn. For the “LABELS” attribute, we additionally 
converted the vector of integers to an one-hot encoding using the Keras function 
to_categorical(). This way, for each index there is a binary matrix that has as many 
columns as the number of the output classes (here four). The column that corresponds to 
the true label of the index has a value equal to 1 and the rest are equal to 0.  
 
Reducing and encoding the features is not sufficient in terms of data preparation. Apart 
from having a smaller input dimension, it is also important to handle the value range of 
its attributes. Therefore, Data Normalization is another important step. Data 
normalization refers to process of modifying the value range of an attribute to restrain it 
to narrower limits. In this case we used the MinMaxScaler class, once again by Scikit-
learn, which transforms features by scaling each feature to a given range. This estimator 
scales and translates each feature individually, such that it is in the given range on the 
training set, i.e. between zero and one. 
 
Taking a closer look to the training set, it is obvious that there is a great imbalance 
between the instances of each class. There are 1,633,190 normal packets, 65,379 
Injection packets, 48,484 Flooding packets and 48,522 Impersonation packets. Leaving 
this proportion as is, would probably lead to overfitting as far as normal packets are 
concerned and underfitting for the rest of the classes. We reduced the number of the 
normal packets to 37,615. The new training dataset, consists of 200,000 indexes and it is 
way more balanced.   
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After training and testing the model the results were not that satisfactory.  Table 4.2 is the 
confusion matrix of the results: 
Actual/Predicted Flooding Impersonati
on 
Injection Normal SUM 
Flooding  5269 333 0 2495 8097 
Impersonation  586 884 0 18609 20079 
Injection 0 17 14308 2357 16682 
Normal 1923 18312 59 510491 530875 
Table 4.2: Confusion Matrix - Multi-Class Classifier (Kolias et al. input) 
 
The Recall Rate of each class, namely Flooding, Impersonation, Injection and Normal, is 
65%, 4%, 86% and 96%, respectively. The problems, needing attention, are two. The first 
one is the False Alarm Rates. False Alarms of an ideal IDS should approach 0%, so there 
is still room for improvement. However, the most important problem is that for the 
misclassified packets that are initially labeled as malicious, the IDS classifies them -in the 
majority- as normals. So the Miss rate increases, making the system very vulnerable. 
 
Actual/Predicted Correctly As another attack As normal 
Flooding 5269 333 2495 
Impersonation 884 584 18609 
Injection 14308 17 2357 
SUM 20461 934 23461 
Table 4.3: Actually/Predicted comparison - Multi-Class Classifier (Kolias et al. input) 
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In order to improve the results we used a different set of features, as suggested by 
Aminanto et al. (2017) and the followed the same procedure (Table 4.4).  
 
 
Table 4.4: Input set as suggested by Aminanto et al. 
 
The new confusion matrix and the distribution of misclassified attacks are presented in 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6, respectively. 
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Actual/Predicted Flooding Impersonati
on 
Injection Normal SUM 
Flooding  4920 0 0 3177 8096 
Impersonation  3 14971 0 5285 20079 
Injection 0 1 16667 14 16682 
Normal 2244 28849 20845 478847 530875 
Table 4.5: Confusion Matrix - Multi-Class Classifier (Aminanto et al. input) 
 
 
 
Actual/Predicted Correctly As another attack As normal 
Flooding 4920 0 3177 
Impersonation 14971 3 5285 
Injection 16667 1 14 
SUM 36558 4 8476 
Table 4.6: Actually/Predicted comparison - Multi-Class Classifier (Aminanto et al. input) 
 
Using this set of features as an input brought better recall rates to the total of the attack 
classes and also,  a reduction the miss rate. However, the false alarm rate increased from 
4% to nearly 10%.  
 
4.3.2 Multiple Binary Classifiers 
The main idea of the second approach is using multiple binary classifiers, each of them 
trained for a different class. The first one is trained to distinguish the normal packets from 
the rest(attacks). To do so, it was necessary to change the labels, which characterized a 
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type of an attack execution method, to the most generic label “attack”. The next level of 
classification is executed by three other binary ANNs, each trained to recognize a 
different type of execution method, namely Flooding Injection and Impersonation. In 
order to train the different ANNs, we used two different training sets. Firstly, we 
modified the dataframe, so that it contained only packets of the attack method it was 
interested to, as well as normal packets. Then we created a set including only the attack 
types. The main idea of the first approach was to feed the ANN with the characteristics of 
only one attack, in order to be specialized. The second approach follows the classic 
methodology of feeding an ANN, namely the packets that it is going to deal with. Since 
the first-level ANN cuts off the normal packets, the input of the second-level ANNs will 
mainly be the 3 type of the attacks.  The labels are once more modified to meet the 
requirements of the binary ANNs. In short, when a packet is classified as an attack by the 
first classifier, it is then tested by the second-level ANNs to identify the method of the 
execution it belongs to.  
 
Just as like the previous model, we used the two different set of features as input. The 
first set of inputs (as suggested by Kolias et al. (2016)) brought up the following 
confusion matrix on the first level of classification (attack/normal). 
 
Actual/Predicted Attacks Normal SUM 
Attacks 1317 43541 44858 
Normal 547 530238 530785 
 
Table 4.7: Confusion Matrix (Attack/Normal) - Multi Binary Classifiers (Kolias et al. 
input) 
         
 
The false alarm has been reduced to a percentage below 1%, precisely to 0.1% and the 
recall of normal is nearly 100%. On the other hand, the recall rate of the attacks has 
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dropped to 2.9%. It is obvious, that there is no point for further classification. The IDS is 
neither efficient nor functional. 
 
Last but no least, the same structure has been tested with the different set of features as 
input. The confusion matrix of the first level ANN is presented below 
 
Actual/Predicted Attacks Normal SUM 
Attacks 44108 750 44858 
Normal 1801 53341 55142 
Table 4.8: Confusion Matrix (Attack/Normal) - Multi Binary Classifiers (Aminanto et al. 
input) 
 
 
The recall of normal is 97% while the attack recall is 98%. The improvement, comparing 
the model to the previous structures, is more than obvious. Every packet that is now 
considered an attack is now checked by the next levels classifiers, which are responsible 
for each of the attack methods. 
  
 Next the packets are checked for the Injection method  
Actual/Predicted Injection Not Injection SUM 
Injection 16668 0 16668 
Not Injection 19077 9439 28516 
Table 4.9: Confusion Matrix (Injection/Not Injection) - Multi Binary Classifiers 
(Aminanto et al. input)-Normal/Injection Training Dataset 
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Actual/Predicted Injection Not Injection SUM 
Injection 0 16668 16668 
Not Injection 9946 23477 33423 
Table 4.10: Confusion Matrix (Injection/Not Injection) - Multi Binary Classifiers 
(Aminanto et al. input)-All Attacks Training Dataset 
 
 
Table 4.9 shows the results of the Normal/Injection training set. There is a recall rate of 
100 % concerning the attacks, although the false alarm is nearly 67% which is not 
desirable. The Table 4.10 shows the confusion matrix after using the training set 
including all types of attack. Recall Rate is 0%. In other words the ANN is totally 
unfunctional. 
 
 
 
Concerning the Impersonation Classification, Table 4.11 shows the confusion matrix of 
the ANN trained with the Normal/Injection Dataset. 
 
Actual/Predicted Impersonation Not Impersonation SUM 
Impersonation 14603 5443 20046 
Not Impersonation 3 19884 19887 
Table 4.11: Confusion Matrix (Impersonation/Not Impersonation) - Multi Binary 
Classifiers (Aminanto et al. input) - Normal/Impersonation Training Dataset 
 
The recall of normal are nearly 100% for the normal, which at the same time means 
almost 0% false alarm rate. The Impersonation recall is 73%, keeping the miss rate to a 
27%. 
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Actual/Predicted Impersonation Not Impersonation SUM 
Impersonation 15 20046 20046 
Not Impersonation 6603 22544 19887 
Table 4.12: Confusion Matrix (Impersonation/Not Impersonation) - Multi Binary 
Classifiers (Aminanto et al. input) - All Attacks Training Dataset 
Just like the Injection Classification, Impersonation Recall Rate is approximately 0%. 
 
Flooding Classification had completely different outcomes, in comparison with the 
previous two attack methods. Table 4.13 shows the confusion matrix after using the 
Normal/Flooding training set. Although there is 0% false alarm, the Flooding recall rate 
is 0%.      
Actual/Predicted Flooding Not Flooding SUM 
Flooding 0 6872 6872 
Not Flooding 0 42565 42565 
Table 4.13: Confusion Matrix (Flooding/Not Flooding) - Multi Binary Classifiers 
(Aminanto et al. input)-Normal/Flooding Training Dataset 
 
The results after training the ANN with the second dataset (Table 4.14) are very 
encouraging. We have a Flooding recall rate equaling 100% and 5% false alarm. 
 
Actual/Predicted Flooding Not Flooding SUM 
Flooding 5766 0 5766 
Not Flooding 1908 35977 37885 
31 
 
Table 4.14: Confusion Matrix (Flooding/Not Flooding) - Multi Binary Classifiers 
(Aminanto et al. input)-All Attacks Training Dataset 
 
Flooding attacks are orchestrated by a bunch of packets flooding the network. There is no 
need for these packets to have significant differences from normal traffic. Considering 
this, training a network to have distinguish normal packets from flooding ones, when 
there is no short temp memory to recognise a stream of packets, is not very effective. 
 
After completing the classification from all binary ANNs we note a false alarm of 3 % 
and a miss rate of 13.8%. 
 
4.4 Results 
Binary classifiers, were more efficient in detecting attacks. The most efficient models, by 
looking the overall performance, are certainly the ones, using the input as suggested by 
Aminanto et al. (2017). The biggest flaw of the multiple binary classifiers is the more 
time needed due to the two-phase detection. The most suitable training set, for the 
second-level classification on the binary classifier, depends on the attack. Figures 4.1 and 
4.2 show the performance of the different architectures for comparison. The number after 
the Classifier states the number of attributes used. 19 as suggested by Kolias et al. (2016), 
25 as suggested by Aminanto et al.(2017). 
As far as the binary classifiers are concerned, we used the results with better recall rate 
(Normal/One_Attack training set for Impersonation and Injection, All Attack types 
training set for Flooding). 
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Figure 4.1: Overall Recall Rate 
 
Figure 4.2: Overall False Alarm and Miss Rate 
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5. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
We experimented with 2 different sets of attributes, used as input, and 2 different ANN 
architectures. It is clear that the set suggested by Aminanto et al.(2017) is a better choice 
than the input set suggested by Kolias et al.(2016). This is even more obvious, in the 
Binary Classifier, where the fist level, that tells if a packet is normal or not, fails with a 
very notable recall rate 2.9%. Furthermore, we compared two different training sets 
during the second-level attack of the Multiple Binary Classifier, and we found the most 
suitable for each attack. The most rewarding results were those of the Flooding attack, in 
the Binary Classification. We achieved a detection rate of 100% and a 5% false alarm. 
The total miss rate which equals to 13.8% is also very encouraging. 
 
In the near future, we plan to create a LSTM ANN to test if and how a short temp 
memory will impact the results. Moreover, we could redesign the second-level binary 
ANNs in order to run simultaneously. This way, we will save time and make the model 
even more efficient.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
References 
Aminanto, M. E., & Kim, K. C. (2018). Improving Detection of Wi-Fi Impersonation  
by Fully  Unsupervised Deep Learning. Information Security Applications, 
212-223. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-93563-8_18 
Aminanto, M. E., Tanuwidjaja, H. C., Yoo, P. D., & Kim, K. (2017). Wi-Fi intrusion  
detection using weighted-feature selection for neural networks classifier. 2017 
International Workshop on Big Data and Information Security (IWBIS). 
doi:10.1109/iwbis.2017.8275109 
Barbeau, M., Hall, J., & Kranakis, E. (2006). Detecting Impersonation Attacks in  
Future Wireless and Mobile Networks. Secure Mobile Ad-hoc Networks and 
Sensors, 80-95. doi:10.1007/11801412_8 
Bot Traffic Report 2016. (2017, January 26). Retrieved from  
https://www.incapsula.com/blog/bot-traffic-report-2016.html 
Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update,  
2016?2021 White Paper. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-
networking-index-vni/mobile-white-paper-c11-520862.html 
Da, S. I., Hernane, S. D., Andrade, F. R., Liboni, L. H., & Dos, R. A. (2017). Artificial  
Neural Networks: A Practical Course. Cham: Springer. 
Datasets | MIT Lincoln Laboratory. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.ll.mit.edu/r-
d/datasets 
Dawson, C. W., Wilby, R. L., Harpham, C., Brown, M. R., Cranston, E., & Darby, E.  
35 
 
J. (2000, August). Modelling Ranunculus presence in the Rivers test and 
Itchen using artificial neural networks. In Proceedings of international 
conference on geocomputation, Greenwich, UK. 
Denning, D. (1987). An Intrusion-Detection Model. IEEE Transactions on Software  
Engineering, SE-13(2), 222-232. doi:10.1109/tse.1987.232894 
Dias, L. P., Cerqueira, J. J., Assis, K. D., & Almeida, R. C. (2017). Using artificial  
neural network in intrusion detection systems to computer networks. 2017 9th 
Computer Science and Electronic Engineering (CEEC). 
doi:10.1109/ceec.2017.8101615 
Giovinazzo, W. A. (2017, May 11). Overfitting / Underfitting – How Well Does Your  
Model Fit? Retrieved from 
https://meditationsonbianddatascience.com/2017/05/11/overfitting-
underfitting-how-well-does-your-model-fit/ 
Haykin, S. S. (1999). Neural networks : a comprehensive foundation. 
HIDS (Host-Based Intrusion Detection System) - Bauman National Library. (n.d.).  
Retrieved from https://en.bmstu.wiki/HIDS_(Host-
Based_Intrusion_Detection_System) 
Hunter, J. D. (2007). Matplotlib: A 2D Graphics Environment. Computing in Science  
& Engineering, 9(3), 90-95. doi:10.1109/mcse.2007.55 
JEFTOVIC, M. A. (2018). MANAGING MISSION - CRITICAL DOMAINS AND DNS:  
Demystifying nameservers, dns, and domain names. S.l.: PACKT 
PUBLISHING LIMITED.  
KDD Cup 1999 Data. (1999, October 28). Retrieved from  
36 
 
http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html 
Ketkar, N. (2017). Introduction to Theano. Deep Learning with Python, 35-61.  
doi:10.1007/978-1-4842-2766-4_4Keras | TensorFlow. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
https://www.tensorflow.org/guide/keras  
Kolias, C., Kambourakis, G., Stavrou, A., & Gritzalis, S. (2016). Intrusion Detection  
in 802.11 Networks: Empirical Evaluation of Threats and a Public Dataset. 
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 18(1), 184-208. 
doi:10.1109/comst.2015.2402161 
Lakshmi, I. B., Lakshmi, B. S., & Karthikeyan, R. (2014). Detection and prevention of  
Impersonation attack in wireless networks. International journal of advanced 
research in computer science & technology, 2(1), 267-270. 
Malhotra, A. (2018, February 1). Tutorial on Feedforward Neural Network ? Part 1 ?  
Akanksha Malhotra ? Medium. Retrieved from 
https://medium.com/@akankshamalhotra24/tutorial-on-feedforward-neural-
network-part-1-659eeff574c3 
Model Fit: Underfitting vs. Overfitting - Amazon Machine Learning. (n.d.). Retrieved  
from https://docs.aws.amazon.com/machine-learning/latest/dg/model-fit-
underfitting-vs-overfitting.html 
NumPy — NumPy. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.numpy.org/ 
OWASP Top Ten 2017 Project - OWASP. (n.d.). Retrieved from  
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_2017_Project 
Protić, D. (2018). Review of KDD Cup '99, NSL-KDD and Kyoto 2006+ datasets.  
Vojnotehnicki glasnik, 66(3), 580-596. doi:10.5937/vojtehg66-16670 
37 
 
Regan, R., & Manickam, J. M. (2017). A Survey on Impersonation Attack in Wireless  
Networks. International Journal of Security and Its Applications, 11(5), 39-48. 
doi:10.14257/ijsia.2017.11.5.04 
Samuel, A. L. (1959). Some Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of  
Checkers. IBM Journal of Research and Development, 3(3), 210-229. 
doi:10.1147/rd.33.0210 
Scientific Computing Tools for Python — SciPy.org. (n.d.). Retrieved from  
https://scipy.org/about.html 
Seide, F., & Agarwal, A. (2016, August). CNTK: Microsoft's open-source deep- 
learning toolkit. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGKDD International 
Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (pp. 2135-2135). 
ACM. 
Shah, B., & H Trivedi, B. (2012). Artificial Neural Network based Intrusion Detection  
System: A Survey. International Journal of Computer Applications, 39(6), 13-
18. doi:10.5120/4823-7074 
Sommer, R., & Paxson, V. (2010). Outside the Closed World: On Using Machine  
Learning for Network Intrusion Detection. 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security 
and Privacy. doi:10.1109/sp.2010.25 
TensorFlow. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.tensorflow.org/ 
Thanthrige, U. S., Samarabandu, J., & Wang, X. (2016). Machine learning techniques  
for intrusion detection on public dataset. 2016 IEEE Canadian Conference on 
Electrical and Computer Engineering (CCECE). 
doi:10.1109/ccece.2016.7726677 
38 
 
Thing, V. L. (2017). IEEE 802.11 Network Anomaly Detection and Attack  
Classification: A Deep Learning Approach. 2017 IEEE Wireless 
Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC). 
doi:10.1109/wcnc.2017.7925567 
Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks | US-CERT. (n.d.). Retrieved from  
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015 
Usha, M., & Kavitha, P. (2016). Anomaly based intrusion detection for 802.11  
networks with optimal features using SVM classifier. Wireless Networks, 
23(8), 2431-2446. doi:10.1007/s11276-016-1300-5 
Van der Aalst, W. M., Rubin, V., Verbeek, H. M., Van Dongen, B. F., Kindler, E., &  
Günther, C. W. (2008). Process mining: a two-step approach to balance 
between underfitting and overfitting. Software & Systems Modeling, 9(1), 87-
111. doi:10.1007/s10270-008-0106-z 
WhiteHat Security 9th Website Security Statistics Report. (2010, May 6). Retrieved  
from https://www.slideshare.net/jeremiahgrossman/whitehat-security-9th-
website-security-statistics-report 
Zeifman, I. (2017). Bot traffic report 2016. Retrieved from  
https://www.incapsula.com/blog/bot-traffic-report-2016.html 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
